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INTRODUCTION	  	  President	  Obama’s	  election	  in	  2008	  marks,	  for	  many	  US	  citizens,	  a	  potential	  endpoint	  to	  a	  trajectory	  of	  racial	  tension	  that	  began	  with	  slavery,	  and	  may	  now,	  in	  what	  they	  call	  our	  “post-­‐racial”	  society,	  be	  put	  to	  rest	  at	  last.	  For	  them,	  the	  election	  of	  the	  President	  is	  proof	  that	  racial	  equality	  has	  been	  achieved,	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  past	  have	  been	  repaired,	  and	  that	  those	  problems	  may	  now	  be	  set	  aside	  as	  relics	  of	  history	  without	  direct	  relation	  to	  the	  present.	  While	  I	  find	  that	  conclusion	  highly	  questionable	   at	   best,	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   “post-­‐racial	   USA”	   remains	   of	   interest	   to	  me.	  Does	   post-­‐racial	   imply	   that	   race	   no	   longer	   exists	   as	   a	   social	   institution,	   or	   simply	  that	  it	  remains	  with	  us,	  but	  no	  longer	  matters?	  How,	  in	  such	  an	  environment,	  would	  we	  parse	  the	  facts	  of	  slavery	  and	  racial	  tension	  that	  have	  played	  such	  pivotal	  roles	  in	  US	  history	  and	  are	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  race?	  	  	   In	   this	   paper,	   the	   women	   of	   Gayl	   Jones’	   novel	   Corregidora	   provide	   the	  framework	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	  way	   that,	   as	   a	   culture,	  we	   remember	   and	   cope	  with	   the	   trauma	   of	   slavery	   in	   the	   Unites	   States.	   I	   propose	   that	   Ursa	   Corregidora	  models	   a	   strategy	   of	   remembering	   that	   allows	   her	   to	   learn	   from,	   and	   thus	  move	  beyond	  her	  trauma,	  rather	  than	  trapping	  herself	  in	  a	  cycle	  of	  repetition.	  Ursa’s	  break	  from	   this	   cycle	   is	   a	   corrective	   or	   updating	   force	   in	   the	   history	   of	   her	   family	   and	  therefore	   serves	   here	   as	   a	   context	   for	   discourse	   on	   repairing	   our	   relationship,	  collectively,	  to	  some	  of	  our	  worst	  national	  memories.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  that	  concern,	  however,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  determine	  the	   stakes	   of	   this	   discourse.	   In	   a	   social	   climate	   in	   which	   slavery	   has	   become,	   for	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many,	  an	  uncomfortable	  topic	  with	  little	  apparent	  relevance	  to	  life	  today,	  it	  does	  not	  go	   without	   saying	   that	   we,	   as	   a	   nation,	   still	   have	   a	   relationship	   to	   that	   memory.	  	  However,	   with	   racial	   discrimination	   and	   prejudice	   still	   giving	   momentum	   to	   all	  facets	  of	  American	  social	  inequality,	  it	  seems	  prudent	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  period	  of	  history	  in	  which	  that	  tension	  was	  at	  its	  height	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  its	  resonances	  –	  its	  ripples	  –	  with	  our	  present.	  Jones’	  Corregidora	  demonstrates,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  discussion,	   an	   individualized	   anecdote	   of	   this	   resonance	   of	   past	   with	   present	   by	  illustrating	  how,	   even	   generations	   removed	   from	   the	   end	  of	   slavery	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  the	  protagonist	  is	  nonetheless	  unable	  to	  escape	  its	  influence.	  	  In	  using	   this	  paper	  as	  a	  vehicle	   for	  constructing	  Ursa’s	  story	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	   our	   national	   race	   relations,	   I	   seek	   to	   enter	   the	   discourse	   on	   “dealing”	   with	  slavery,	  and	  suggest	  a	  possible	  avenue	  of	  eventual	   improvement.	   I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  I	  am	  providing	  the	  answer	  to	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  been	  with	  this	  country	  almost	  since	   its	   inception,	  merely	  that	   I	  attempt	  here	  to	  provide	  a	  useful	  angle	   for	  continuing	  the	  conversation.	  	   	  GAYLE	  JONES’	  CORREGIDORA	  	  
Corregidora,	   published	   in	   1975	   by	   Beacon	   Press,	   is	   Jones’	   first	   novel,	  following	  after	  her	  only	  dramatic	  work	  and	  first	  publication.	  The	  novel	  precedes	  a	  total	  of	  four	  others	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing,	  written	  over	  several	  decades.	  Among	  her	  works	   are	   also	   included	   a	   handful	   of	   poetry	   collections,	   and	   a	   single	  work	   of	  literary	   criticism	   published	   in	   the	   long	   gap	   between	   her	   third	   and	   fourth	   novels.	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Both	  Jones’	  fictional	  and	  critical	  works	  are	  eloquent	  of	  a	  deep	  and	  abiding	  concern	  with	  the	  transmission	  of	  history	  through	  story-­‐telling	  and	  memory.	  For	   the	   line	   of	   women	   featured	   in	   the	   novel,	   the	   urgency	   of	   history	   is	   an	  intense	   factor	   in	   their	   daily	   lives.	   The	   protagonist	   Ursa	   bears	   the	   burden	   of	   her	  family’s	   devotion	   to	   record-­‐keeping,	   as	   had	   her	   mother	   before	   her,	   and	   her	  grandmother	   and	   great	   grandmother,	   with	   whom	   the	   line	   began.	   Purchased	   as	   s	  slave	  and	  forced	  to	  work	   in	  the	  brothels	  of	   their	  master,	   the	  Portuguese	  merchant	  Corregidora,	   Ursa’s	   great	   grandmother	   is	   raped	   repeatedly,	   by	   not	   only	   the	  customers,	  but	  Corregidora	  himself,	  and	  the	  man	  eventually	   fathers	  a	  child:	  Ursa’s	  grandmother,	  who	  herself	   is	   the	  victim	  of	  Corregidora’s	   sexual	  abuse.	   In	   this	  way,	  Ursa’s	   grandmother	   and	   mother	   are	   fathered	   by	   the	   same	   man,	   who	   maintains	  control	  of	  the	  family	  even	  after	  the	  Civil	  War,	  despite	  having	  burned	  the	  papers	  that	  documented	  his	  ownership,	  and	  thus	  the	  record	  of	   the	  wrongs	  he	  had	  done	  to	   the	  women.	  	  With	  the	  official	  proof	  of	  their	  enslavement	  and	  continuing	  sexual	  abuse	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  destroyed,	  the	  only	  remaining	  evidence,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  women	  are	   concerned,	   are	   they	   themselves,	   and	   the	  memories	  of	   the	   events	  of	   their	   lives	  passed	   down	   from	  mother	   to	   daughter.	   These	  memories	   constitute	   an	   archive	   of	  sorts	  that	  they	  preserve	  in	  the	  only	  way	  they	  know	  how:	  by	  living	  it	  over	  and	  over	  again.	  This	  preoccupation	  consumes	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  members,	  who	  lock	  themselves	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  temporal	  stasis,	  such	  that	  the	  memories	  of	  one	  woman	  are	  not	  merely	  related	  to	  the	  next,	  but	  become	  that	  next	  woman’s	  own.	  Thus,	  despite	  being	  at	  least	  a	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generation	  removed	   from	  the	  man’s	  direct	  control,	  Ursa	  recalls	  him	  as	   though	  she	  had	  known	  him	  herself.	  With	   these	   memories	   comes	   the	   duty	   of	   passing	   them	   on,	   to	   “make	  generations”	   to	   preserve	   the	   archive	   (Jones,	   45).	   It	   is	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   family’s	  memory-­‐keeping	  that	  creates	  the	  principle	  conflict	  as,	  from	  the	  first	  few	  pages,	  Ursa	  is	  struck	  down	  by	  her	  then-­‐husband,	  Mutt,	  in	  an	  attack	  that	  leaves	  her	  hospitalized	  and	  in	  need	  of	  an	  emergency	  hysterectomy,	  rendering	  her	  barren,	  and	  thus,	  unable	  to	   produce	   any	   new	   generations	   to	   carry	   the	   record	   forward.	   Remembering	   the	  dehumanizing	   indignities	   of	   the	   brothel,	   in	   which	   Corregidora	   “made	   them	  make	  love	   to	   anyone,	   so	   they	   couldn't	   love	   anyone,”	   (Jones,	   118)	   and	   afterward,	   the	  complicated	   relationship	   that	   ensures,	   and	   ends	   in	   violent	   separation,	   each	  generation	  of	  women	  remains	  unable	  to	  maintain	  a	  relationship	  with	  any	  of	  the	  men	  in	  their	  lives	  except	  for	  the	  old	  plantation	  owner’s	  memory.	  In	  Ursa’s	  case,	  the	  loss	  of	   her	   ability	   to	   form	   relationships	   has	   intensified	   to	   the	   point	   where	   she	   loses	  sensation	   altogether,	   apparently	   unable	   to	   feel	   her	   genitals	   or	   anus,	   as	  demonstrated	  in	  her	  insistence	  as	  a	  young	  girl	  that	  she	  could	  feel	  nothing	  during	  the	  game	   of	   doctor	   she	   played	   with	   a	   neighbor	   child.	   This	   despite	   her	   mother’s	  observation	  that	  “he	  was	  feeling	  up	  [her]	  asshole."	  	  (Jones,	  46).	  	  Even	  as	  an	  adult,	  Ursa	  seems	  only	  able	  to	  attempt	  relationships	  with	  men,	  but	  not	   to	   carry	   them	   through	   for	   extended	   periods,	   as	   her	   preoccupation	   with	  Corregidora	   and	   the	   constant	   pressure	   from	   her	   family	   (as	   she	   recalls	   them)	   to	  remember	   him	   prevents	   this.	   For	   example,	   her	   second	   marriage	   to	   a	   man	   called	  Tadpole	  ends	  in	  frustration	  and	  heartbreak	  as	  he,	  angry	  at	  her	  unwillingness	  to	  have	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sex	  with	  him,	  despite	  her	  still	  being	  capable	  of	  the	  act,	  has	  an	  affair	  with	  a	  younger	  woman.	  Ursa’s	  sexual	  unfeeling,	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  her	  grief	  over	  the	  loss	  of	  her	  uterus	  and	  the	  consequences	  that	  that	  loss	  holds	  for	  her	  ability	  to	  make	  generations,	  thus	  stands	  as	  a	  barrier	  between	  her	  and	  her	  new	  husband,	  and	  that	  barrier	  eventually	  dissolves	  their	  union.	  	  Eventually,	   haunted	   by	   her	   family’s	   memories	   and	   the	   stagnated,	   abortive	  nature	  of	  her	  own	  present-­‐day	  relationships,	  Ursa	  returns	  to	  her	  mother,	  the	  closest	  thing	  she	  has	  to	  an	  original	  source.	  What	  she	  asks	  to	  hear	  about,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  Corregidora	   that	   reverberates	   through	   the	   history	   of	   her	   family.	   Rather,	   she	  enquires	  about	  her	  father,	  and	  the	  relationship	  her	  mother	  had	  to	  him.	  	  While	  Ursa’s	  mother	  does	  respond	  with	  the	  story	  of	  Ursa’s	  father	  and	  herself,	  it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   conversation	   quickly	   returns	   to	   the	   subject	   of	  Corregidora,	  even	  though,	  in	  both	  the	  novel’s	  present	  and	  the	  within	  the	  story	  Ursa’s	  mother	  is	  telling,	  the	  Portuguese	  slave	  trader	  is	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  conversation.	  	  “After	   [Martin,	   Ursa’s	   father]	   come,	   they	   didn’t	   talk	   to	  me	   about	  making	   generations	   anymore,	   or	   about	   anything	   that	   happened	  with	   Corregidora,	   but	   Martin	   and	   me	   could	   hear	   them	   in	   there	  talking	   between	   themselves	   .	   .	   .	   Great	   Gram	   telling	   Mama	   how	  Corregidora	  wouldn’t	   let	   her	   see	   some	  man	   because	   he	  was	   too	  black.”	  Mama	  kept	  talking	  until	   it	  wasn’t	  her	  that	  was	  talking	  but	  Great	  Gram.	  I	  stared	  at	  her	  because	  she	  wasn’t	  Mama	  now,	  she	  was	  Great	  Gram	  talking:	  “He	  wouldn’t	  let	  me	  see	  him,	  cause	  he	  said	  he	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was	   too	   black	   for	   me.	   He	   liked	   his	   womens	   black,	   but	   he	   didn’t	  wont	  us	  with	  no	  black	  mens.”	  (Jones	  141)	  	  In	   this	  passage,	  Ursa,	   as	   the	   first	  person	  narrator,	  describes	   the	  moment	  at	  which	   she	   perceives	   that	   her	  mother’s	   account	   of	   the	   household	   controversy	   that	  arose	   from	   Martin’s	   presence	   in	   the	   house	   becomes	   indistinguishable	   from	   the	  equivalent	  episode	  in	  the	  life	  of	  her	  Great	  Gram,	  when	  she	  is	  thought	  by	  Corregidora	  to	  have	  had	  sexual	  contact	  with	  a	  black	  man,	  even	  though	  she	  had	  not.	  With	  Ursa’s	  parents,	  as	  in	  that	  earlier	  instance,	  the	  relatively	  brief	  contact	  was	  broken	  up	  by	  the	  family’s	  policing	  factors	  (Corregidora	  in	  his	  possessive	  rage	  and	  Ursa’s	  grandmother	  in	   her	   slavish	   adherence	   to	   Corregidora’s	   rules)	   and	   in	   both	   cases,	   ended	   as	   the	  black	  man	  was	  chased	  out	  of	  each	  woman’s	  life	  for	  good.	  To	  Martin,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  force	  that	  renders	  him	  a	  perpetual	  outsider	  in	   the	   family	  was	   not	  merely	   the	   Portuguese	   plantation	   owner’s	   control	   over	   the	  women.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  Martin	  who	   finally	   addresses	   the	   reader’s	   likely	   puzzlement	  over	   the	   fact	   that	   when	   the	   Civil	   War	   ends,	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   women	   to	  Corregidora	  does	  not,	  and,	  not	  until	  Ursa	  wheedles	  the	  story	  of	  her	  own	  conception	  from	  her	  mother	  is	  the	  reader’s	  confusion	  resolved:	  "I	  think	  what	  really	  made	  them	  dislike	  Martin	  was	  because	  he	  had	  the	  nerve	  to	  ask	  them	  what	  I	  never	  had	  the	  nerve	  to	  ask."	  	  "What	  was	  that?"	  	  "How	  much	  was	  hate	  for	  Corregidora	  and	  how	  much	  was	  love.”	  (Jones,	  150)	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While	   that	   question	   remains	   without	   an	   explicit	   answer	   throughout	   the	  work,	  the	  novel	  ends	  with	  Ursa	  returning	  to	  Mutt,	  her	  own	  Corregidora,	  of	  her	  own	  volition,	  resuming	  the	  emotional	  and	  sexual	  relationship	  she	  had	  originally	  rejected	  after	   his	   attack.	   Ursa’s	   resumption	   of	   their	   relationship,	   however,	   is	  marked	   by	   a	  crucial	   condition	   that	   establishes	   its	   difference	   from	   that	   between	   the	   original	  Corregidora	  and	  her	  great-­‐grandmother.	  Unlike	  the	  latter	  relationship,	  which	  ended,	  it	   is	   hinted,	   in	   a	   violent	   attack	   that	   left	   the	   original	   Corregidora	   as	   reproductively	  crippled	   as	   Mutt	   has	   left	   Ursa,	   the	   two	   of	   them	   return	   to	   each	   other	   with	   the	  admission	  that	  they	  do	  want	  a	  relationship,	  but	  not	  with	  partners	  that	  will	  hurt	  them	  (Jones,	  213).	  This	  fictional	  work	  accomplishes,	  on	  a	  microcosmic	  scale,	  an	  anecdote	  of	  how	  slavery	  remains	  with	  one	  family	  long	  after	  its	  abolishment,	  and	  what	  steps	  might	  be	  taken	  to	  address	  its	  influence	  constructively.	  While	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  suggest	  that	   the	   novel	   provides	   a	   viable	   solution	   to	   many	   decades	   of	   post-­‐slavery	   racial	  tension,	  Corregidora	   does	  offer	  a	   starting	  point	   to	  a	  discourse	  on	  dealing	  with	   the	  past.	  	   	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  	  Fradenburg	   and	   Freccero,	   in	   their	   introduction	   to	   Modern	   Sexualities,	  propose	  that	  “history	  is	  how	  the	  living	  remember	  the	  dead,	  how	  the	  familiar	  know	  the	  unfamiliar;	   it	   is	  how	  the	  dead	  and	  the	  strange	   instruct	   the	   living	   .	   .	   .	   [how]	  the	  knowable	   and	   the	  unknowable,	   become	  mutually	   intelligible”	   (xiii).	   The	  history	  of	  
	  	   9	  
US	   slavery,	   then,	   in	   this	   way	   of	   thinking,	   could	   do	   nothing	   less	   than	   provide	   the	  framework	   with	   which	   Americans	   interact	   with	   their	   past	   and	   understand	   their	  present.	  The	  process	  of	  remembering	  slavery	  (as	  with	  any	  other	  part	  of	  our	  national	  history)	   is	  what	   allows	  us	   to	  make	   sense	  of	   a	  present	   that,	  without	   the	   informing	  quality	  of	  history,	  would	  lack	  the	  otherwise	  unknowable,	  but	  indispensible	  context.	  	  Michelle	  Alexander	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  how	  crucial	  this	  context	  is	  to	  our	  present-­‐day	  realities.	  In	  her	  book,	  The	  New	  Jim	  Crow,	  she	  traces	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  the	  practice	  of	  present-­‐day	  law	  making	  and	  enforcement	  has	  led	  to	  a	  de	  facto	  continuation	  of	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  conditions	  that	  followed	  the	  Civil	  War.	  The	  original	  Jim	  Crow	   itself,	   she	   notes,	   constituted	   a	   legally	   supported	   continuance	   of	   slavery	   in	  every	  way	  but	  name,	  just	  as	  the	  formulation	  of	  drug	  enforcement,	  prosecution,	  and	  the	   treatment	   of	   convicts,	   she	   argues,	   repeats	   the	   effects	   of	   Jim	   Crow	   under	   an	  ostensibly	   colorblind	   system	   that,	   in	   practice,	   persecutes	   minorities	   almost	  exclusively	  (12).	  The	   groundwork	   she	   lays	   for	   her	   greater	   argument	   provides	   a	   forceful	  example	   of	   how	   the	   thread	   of	   one	   historical	   era	   remains	  woven	   into	   our	   current	  social	   fabric.	  Without	   knowledge	   and	   consideration,	   that	   is,	   without	   remembering	  slavery	  and	   Jim	  Crow,	   she	   illustrates,	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  perceive,	  understand,	  or	  resolve	  the	  social	  problem	  of	  mass	  incarceration	  that	  plagues	  our	  nation	  today.	  	  
Corregidora	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  dependence	  on	  memory	  is	  at	  best	  a	  two-­‐edged	  sword,	  as	  much	  a	  source	  of	  strength	  and	  purpose	  as	  a	  paralyzing	  distraction	  from	  the	  business	  of	  living	  life	  in	  the	  present.	  The	  weight	  of	  memory	  in	  the	  family	  of	  Corregidora	   women	   then	   functions	   as	   an	   interesting	   point	   of	   comparison	   to	   the	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fetishization	  of	   the	  child	  discussed	   in	  Edelman’s	  early	  chapter	   in	  No	  Future:	  Queer	  
Theory	   and	   the	   Death	   Drive.	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   obsession	   with	   protecting	   fictive	  children	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   adults’	   attempt	   to	   “restore”	   to	   themselves	   a	   sense	   of	  innocence	   and	   a	   perfection	   of	   circumstance	   that	   never	   existed	   in	   any	   real	   sense.	  Moreover,	   this	   reproductive	   futurism,	   to	   use	   Edleman’s	   term,	   is	   precisely	   what	  keeps	  that	  goal	  out	  of	  reach.	  (21,	  27)	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  author	  flips	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “death	  drive,”	   an	   alleged	   tendency	   of	   the	   queer	   body	   to	   pursue	   social	   suicide	   and	  spiral	   with	   purpose	   toward	   ultimate	   deterioration,	   by	   suggesting	   that	   the	   very	  insistence	   on	   othering	  queerness	   locks	  normative	   society	   into	   its	   own,	   and	  actual	  death	   drive,	   characterized	   not	   so	   much	   by	   a	   dramatic	   implosion,	   but	   by	   a	   less	  apparent,	   and	   ultimately	   more	   harmful	   kind	   of	   deterioration.	   Worse,	   this	   static	  fixation	   leaves	   the	   normative	   social	   body	   unable	   to	   address	   or	   even	   perceive	   the	  nature	  of	   that	  deterioration.	  What	  Edelman	  describes	   is	   stagnation,	   a	   social	   order	  wasting	  away	  before	  a	  false	  image	  of	  itself	  like	  Narcissus	  at	  his	  reflection	  (27).	  This	  result	  is	  not	  far,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  shortly,	  from	  the	  one	  that	  Benn-­‐Michaels	  hints	  is	  the	  danger	   of	   fixating	   on	   slavery	   as	   a	   past	   that	   requires	   our	   constant,	   continuing	  attention.	  Ursa’s	   story	   picks	   up	   at	   the	   place	   that	   her	   family	   has	   occupied	   for	  generations.	   Even	   after	   her	   divorce	   from	   Mutt,	   she	   seems	   only	   able	   to	   attempt	  relationships,	   but	   not	   to	   carry	   them	   through	   for	   extended	   periods	   because	   of	   her	  thoughts	   about	   Corregidora	   and	   the	   constant	   pressure	   from	   her	   family	   (as	   she	  recalls	  them)	  to	  remember	  him.	  In	  other	  words,	  so	  concerned	  is	  she	  with	  passing	  on	  their	  experiences	  that	  she	  becomes	  essentially	  unable	  to	  make	  her	  own.	  In	  this	  way,	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the	   greater	   project	   of	   archival	   preservation	   fails,	   as	   the	   successive	   generations	   of	  women	   can	   only	   repeat	   experiences	   in	   that	   archive	   without	   adding	   any	   new	  contribution	   of	   their	   own.	   As	   Edelman	   predicts,	   the	   result	   is	   stagnation,	  with	   the	  ultimate	   consequence	   of	   social	   death.	   As	   is	   illustrated	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	  however,	   this	   repetition	   is	   neither	   coincidental	   nor	   accidental.	   Rather,	   Ursa’s	  grandmother	   sought	   intentionally	   to	   preserve	   her	   daughter’s	   relationship	   to	  Corregidora	   as	   nearly	   to	   her	   own	   mothers’	   as	   possible.	   Unlike	   in	   Edelman’s	  examples,	  the	  preservation	  of	  memory	  here	  is	  a	  force	  of	  applied	  will,	  and	  not	  merely	  unconscious	  folly.	  Ursa’s	  grandmother	  does	  not	  want	   there	  to	  be	  any	  difference	  or	  progress	  with	  time,	  and	  sees	  Ursa’s	  mother’s	  transgression	  as	  a	  betrayal	  of	  that	  goal.	  To	  depart	  from	  the	  habit	  of	  Corregidora	  is,	  to	  the	  grandmother’s	  way	  of	  thinking,	  not	  only	  to	  forget	  the	  record	  of	  slavery	  and	  one’s	  duty	  to	  it,	  but	  to	  actually	  destroy	  it.	  To	  depart	   from	  the	  past,	  however,	   that	   is,	   to	  depart	   from	  our	  own	  national	  memory	  of	  slavery,	   is	   seen	  by	  some	  as	   the	  only	  way	   to	  dismiss	   the	  misconception	  that	  that	  past	  should	  still	  hold	  sway	  over	  the	  present.	  In	  his	  essay,	  “You	  Who	  Never	  was	   There:	   Slavery	   and	   the	   New	   Historicism,	   Deconstruction	   and	   the	   Holocaust,”	  Benn-­‐Michaels	   addresses	   this	   position	   with	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Americans	  believe	  their	  myths.	  For	  Benn-­‐Michaels,	  the	  question’s	  urgency	  is	  that	  myth	  is	  a	  kind	  of	   illusion,	  a	  reference	  to	  an	  event	  in	  the	  past,	  thought	  (he	  might	  say	  imagined)	  by	  those	  in	  the	  present	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  that	  extends	  well	  beyond	  the	  lives	  of	  anyone	  who	  actually	  experienced	  it.	  His	  use	  of	  the	  word	  to	  describe	  present-­‐day	  reference	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  abolished	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  in	  1863,	  then,	  already	  begins	  to	  illustrate	  his	  implication	  that	  he	  believes	  that	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the	  era’s	  relevance	  is	  past,	  and	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  merely	  an	  illusion.	  What	  he	  does	  not	  address,	  and	  as	  other	  voices	  will	  illustrate	  later	  in	  this	  paper,	   the	   effects	   of	   slavery	   are	   still	   with	   us,	   and	   that	   bare	   reality	   weakens	   his	  contention.	  The	   question	   he	   poses,	   then,	   of	   whether	   Americans	   believe	   their	   myths	   is	  therefore	  a	  question	  of	  whether	   the	  belief	   in	   slavery	  as	  a	  present	   influence	   is	   still	  with	  us	  as	  a	  nation,	  which,	  he	  indicates,	  it	  does,	  but	  the	  other	  main	  assertion	  of	  his	  essay	  adds	  another	  layer	  to	  that	  question.	  Insisting	  that	  “slavery	  can	  be	  and	  must	  be	  either	   remembered	   or	   forgotten,”	   draws	   our	   attention	   to	   his	   feeling	   that	   we	   are	  presented	  with	  a	  choice	  –	  so	   that	  he	   is	  not	  only	  asking	  whether	  slavery	  remains	  a	  part	  of	  our	   conceptions	  of	   the	  present,	  but	   also	  whether	  or	  not	   it	   should.	   In	  other	  words,	  slavery	  must	  either	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  addressed	  as	  part	  of	  our	  historical	  narrative	  in	  the	  present,	  or	  discarded	  as	  irrelevant.	  For	  him,	  indeed,	  this	  choice	  has	  real	  consequences.	  His	  concerns	  echo	  Edelman’s	  in	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  our	  decision	  to	  remember	  slavery	  would	  not	  only	  be	  an	  insistence	  on	  its	  continuing	  influence,	  but	  what	  actually	  causes	  that	  influence.	  The	  situation,	  then,	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  one	  well	  within	  our	  control:	  without	  reference	  to	  slavery	  as	  a	  foundational	  influence	  on	  our	  current	  society,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  maintain	  a	  memory	  of	  it	  at	  all,	  and	  thus	  we	  could,	  in	  theory,	  be	  rid	  of	  slavery’s	  effects	  simply	  by	  deciding	  they	  did	  not	  exist.	  	  In	   order	   to	   answer	   his	   question,	   however,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   examine	  what	  Benn-­‐Michaels	   means	   by	   “myth.”	   Using	   the	   example	   of	   Toni	   Morrison’s	   Beloved,	  Benn-­‐Michaels	  observes	  that	  slavery	  is	  experienced	  indirectly	  through	  story	  telling	  by	  people	  that,	  since	  they	  live	  in	  the	  present,	  have	  no	  actual	  memory	  of	  it.	  Myth,	  in	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Benn-­‐Michaels’	   thinking,	   does	   not	   require	   of	   the	   believer	   any	   form	   of	   direct	  experience	  with	  the	  subject	  of	   the	  myth.	   In	  this	  way,	  he	  allows	  for	  memory	  that	   is	  not	   technically	  memory	   at	   all,	   and	  which	   is	   passed	   culturally	   rather	   than	   through	  experience.	   	   This	   kind	   of	  memory1	   is	   what	   he	   is	   referring	   to	   with	   his	   concept	   of	  “myth.”	  In	  his	  estimation	  then,	  what	  Ursa	  Corregidora	  experiences	  as	  the	  memories	  of	   her	   female	   ancestors	   is	   not	   a	   passing	   on	   of	   memory,	   but	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  mythology,	  and	  one	  that,	  were	  she	  a	  real	  person	  and	  not	  merely	  a	  myth	  herself,	  she	  would	  have	  the	  power	  to	  abolish	  as	  no	  longer	  relevant	  to	  her	  present	  day	  life.	  Relevant	  to	  this	  discussion,	  however,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  a	  particular	  novel’s	  account	   of	   slavery	   may	   be	   fictional	   at	   least	   and	   mythological	   at	   best,	   slavery	   is	  neither	   of	   those	   things.	   What	   seems	   to	   go	   unaddressed	   (though	   certainly	   not	  denied)	   in	   Benn-­‐Michaels’	   analysis	   of	   American	   myth-­‐making	   is	   that	   both	   of	   the	  events	  he	  cites	  –	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  slavery	  in	  the	  United	  States	  actually	  happened.	  This	  is	  worth	  mentioning,	  as	  the	  simple	  laws	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  suggest	  at	  minimum	  a	  link	  between	  past	  and	  present	  that	  cannot	  be	  abolished	  with	  a	  simple	  decision.	  	  Thus	  Benn-­‐Michaels’	  conception	  of	  myth	  lacks	  any	  validation	  of	  the	  force	  that	  our	   historical	   “myths”	   have	   on	   those	   who	   “believe”	   in	   them.	   However,	   Roland	  Barthes	  offers	  a	   further	   reflection	  on	   the	  subject	   that	   informs	  both	  our	  discussion	  here	   and	   Benn-­‐Michaels’.	   In	   his	   book	   Mythologies,	   Barthes	   describes	   myth	   as	   a	  signifier	   that	  has	  more	   than	  a	   single	   signification,	   that	   is,	  which	  has	  meaning	  held	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Not	  only	  does	  he	  reject	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  myth-­‐making,	  but	  he	  does	  so	  by	  comparing	  it	  unfavorably	  both	  to	  a	  	  biological	  or	  “racial”	  memory	  that	  is	  modeled	  in	  a	  science	  fiction	  novel	  he	  mentions,	  and	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  aliens	  (3).	  Quite	  apart	  from	  his	  dismissive	  treatment	  of	  national	  history,	  	  this	  writer	  is	  distressed	  by	  his	  implicit	  derision	  of	  the	  genre	  of	  science-­‐fiction	  and	  not	  just	  a	  little	  because	  of	  her	  concern	  that,	  implied	  in	  this	  dismissal	  is	  the	  feeling	  that	  this	  contempt	  is	  in	  part	  
because,	  rather	  than	  in	  spite	  of,	  its	  mass	  appeal.	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simultaneously	  on	  multiple	  levels	  beyond	  its	  relationship	  to	  its	  signified.	  Moreover,	  in	  his	   formulation	  of	  myth,	   this	  multiplicity	  of	  meaning	  results	   in	  a	   flexibility	  with	  serious	  consequences:	  Entrusted	   with	   “glossing	   over”	   an	   intentional	   concept,	   myth	  encounters	   nothing	   but	   betrayal	   in	   language,	   for	   language	   can	   only	  obliterate	  the	  concept	  if	  it	  hides	  it,	  or	  unmask	  it	  if	  it	  formulates	  it.	  The	  elaboration	  of	  a	  second-­‐order	  semiological	  system	  will	  enable	  myth	  to	  escape	  this	  dilemma:	  driven	  to	  having	  neither	  to	  unveil	  or	  to	  liquidate	  the	   concept,	   it	   will	   naturalize	   it.	   .	   .	   .	   Here	   [is]	   the	   very	   principle	   of	  myth:	  it	  transforms	  history	  into	  nature.	  (Barthes,	  240)	  As	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  clarify,	  Barthes	  is	  suggesting	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  myth	  is	  that	  its	  multiply-­‐signifying	   characteristic	   allows	   the	  meaning	   it	  makes	   to	   the	   observer	  seem	  a	  matter	  of	  course,	  or	  illustrative	  of	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things,	  when	  instead	  it	  is	  the	  reflection	  of	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  manipulation	  (intentional	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  the	  myth	  invoker	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  observer.	  In	  Barthes’s	  conception	  of	  myth,	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  myths	  begin	  with	   a	   citation,	   and	   then	   multiply	   into	   other	   meanings	   that	   still	   coexist	   with	   the	  original	  referent.	  Thus	  Benn-­‐Michaels’	  myth	  of	  slavery	  is	  incomplete.	  In	  choosing	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  “memories”	  held	  by	  “[those]	  who	  never	  [were]	  there,”	  he	  attempts,	  unproductively,	  to	  divorce	  our	  knowledge	  of	  history	  from	  its	  effects	  (Benn-­‐Michaels,	  1).	  	  	   This	   brings	   up	   another	   concern:	  Corregidora	   is	   a	   novel	   –	   a	  work	   of	   fiction.	  Even	   Benn-­‐Michaels’	   example	   of	   Toni	   Morrison’s	   Beloved	   is	   a	   citation	   of	   fiction,	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written	   within	   the	   last	   couple	   of	   decades,	   with	   a	   considerable	   gap	   in	   time,	  generations,	   between	   their	  publication	   and	   the	   time	  of	   their	   stories.	   	  Despite	   this,	  both	   in	   this	   paper	   and	   for	   Benn-­‐Michaels,	   the	   novels	   carry	   the	   weight	   of	   source	  material.	  Thus,	  here	  again	  we	  have	  an	  example	  of	  events	  being	  remembered	  without	  any	  living	  witness.2	  Yet	  both	  novels	  present	  only	  a	   fictional	  anecdote	  of	   the	  past,	  each	  of	  which	  help	  to	  distill	  the	  nature	  of	  slavery’s	  relevance	  to	  the	  present	  in	  a	  way	  more	  concise	  and	   comprehensive	   than	   a	   factual	   account	   of	   a	   slave’s	   lived	   experience	   in	   the	  nineteenth	  century	  could	  do.	  Our	  willingness	  to	  substitute	  works	  of	   literary	  fiction	  for	  historical	  accounts	  is	  indicative	  of	  our	  priorities	  in	  holding	  onto	  the	  past,	  though	  Benn-­‐Michaels	  suggests	  that	  he	  sees	  it	  rather	  as	  our	  devotion	  to	  myth-­‐making.	  As	  he	  put	   it,	   “the	   answer	   to	   the	   question,	   do	   the	   Americans	   believe	   their	  myths,	   is	   yes”	  (Benn-­‐Michaels,	  1).	  Our	  “mythology”	  of	  slavery	  still	   informs	  our	  sense	  of	  ourselves	  as	  a	  nation	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  for	  black	  Americans,	  their	  sense	  of	  their	  own	  identity	  as	   having	   progressed	   up	   from	   that	   horrifying	   beginning.	   Maintenance	   of	   that	  identity,	  however,	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  texts	  for	  which	  citations	  of	  history	  are	  exact.	  	  Rather,	   as	   Corregidora	   and	   Ursa’s	   great-­‐grandmother	   represent	   the	   legends,	  respectively,	  of	  the	  plantation	  owner	  and	  the	  black	  slave	  for	  whom	  beauty	  is	  a	  curse,	  so,	  too,	  do	  such	  texts	  as	  Corregidora	  and	  Beloved3	  become	  part	  of	  the	  archive	  for	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  Corregidora	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  at	  which	  time	  we	  would	  likely,	  only	  seven	  decades	  on,	  still	  have	  had	  living	  witnesses.	  Nevertheless,	  Ursa’s	  present	  is,	  as	  I	  have	  demonstrated,	  mired	  in	  the	  past,	  preoccupied	  with	  and	  even	  performing	  events	  that	  happened	  in	  the	  century	  preceding	  it,	  a	  time	  period	  approximate	  to	  the	  events	  of	  Beloved.	  	  3	  By	  this	  what	  I	  mean	  is	  that	  Beloved	  is	  	  another	  example	  of	  a	  fictional	  slave	  narrative	  which	  focuses	  not	  so	  much	  on	  faithfulness	  to	  any	  real	  individual’s	  history,	  but	  instead	  constructs	  a	  fantastical	  account	  of	  a	  fictional	  slave.	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legend,	  or	  myth	  of	  American	  slavery,	  not	  by	  directly	  citing	  the	  past,	  but	  by	  citing	  our	  concerns	  regarding	  that	  past	  in	  our	  discourse	  in	  the	  present.	  	  Caruth	   explicates	   this	   tendency	   further	   in	   her	   book,	  Unclaimed	   Experience:	  
Trauma,	   Narrative,	   and	   History,	   by	   noting	   that	   understanding	   a	   catastrophe	   of	  history	  –	  her	  example	  is	  the	  bombing	  of	  the	  Japanese	  city	  of	  Hiroshima	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  –	  “can	  only	  be	  perceived,	  it	  would	  seem,	  through	  a	  language	  of	  fiction,	  a	   fiction	   that	   inherently	   erases	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   past	   it	   conveys”	   (49).	   The	  fictionalized	  accounts	  of	   slavery	   that	  Spillers	  notes	  have	  been	  “proliferating”	  since	  Harriet	  Beecher	  Stowe	  and	  her	  Uncle	  Tom	  (53),	  provide	  a	  distance	  from	  which	  we	  can	  view	  our	  traumatic	  national	  history	  comfortably,	  without	  having	  to	  confront	   it	  directly.	  In	  Caruth’s	  estimation,	  this	  distance	  is	  intended	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  hide	  from	  the	  realities	  of	   the	  past,	   to	   erase	   it	   from	  our	  minds,	   if	   not	  history,	   and	   replace	   it	  with	  something	  a	  little	  easier	  to	  accept.	  	  While	  that	  is	  certainly	  an	  option	  and	  a	  hazard	  to	  remain	  alert	  for,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  that	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  the	  role	  of	  fiction	  in	  our	  discourses	  on	  history.	  	  Fictionalized	  accounts	  of	  America’s	  slave	  history	  allow	  a	  means	  through	  which	  we	  might	  begin	  to	  accept	  it	  as	  part	  of	  our	  past	  and	  thus	  begin	  to	   address	   its	   lingering	   influence.	   In	  much	   the	   same	  way,	   this	   paper	   takes	   Jones’	  novel	  as	  an	  entry	  point	  from	  which	  to	  open	  the	  discussion	  here.	  	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   we	  may	   observe	   how	   the	   trajectory	   of	   the	   Corregidora	  family’s	  relation	  to	  memory	  begins	  to	  suggest	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Americans	  and	  their	  history.	  After	  the	  Civil	  War,	  with	  nowhere	  to	  go	  despite	  having	  been	   freed	   from	   their	   enslavement,	   the	   former	   slaves	   of	   the	   United	   States	   also	  returned	   to	   their	   former	   masters,	   under	   arrangements	   not	   unlike	   those	   of	   their	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enslavement,	   just	   as	   the	   Corregidora	   women	   return	   to	   their	   respective	  Corregidoras.	  	   This	  return,	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  baffling	  aspects	  of	  the	  novel,	  may	  cause	  the	  reader	  to	  question,	  as	  does	  Ursa’s	  father,	  what	  factors	  influenced	  and	  led	  up	  to	  it.	  	  REMEMBERING,	  FORGETTING,	  AND	  REPEATING	  	  In	   Ursa’s	   case	   however,	   her	   remembrance	   goes	   further	   than	   simple	   recall.	  Her	  familial	  culture	  inculcates	  her	  with	  access	  to	  a	  trauma	  that,	  until	  she	  begins	  to	  repeat	   the	   sequence	   of	   behavior	   in	   her	   own	   present,	   she	   has	   never	   actually	  experienced.	   	   Freud	   would	   classify	   this	   situation,	   in	   which	   “something	   is	  ‘remembered’	  that	  could	  never	  have	  been	  ‘forgotten’	  since	  it	  was	  never	  at	  any	  point	  noticed,	   never	   conscious,”	   as	   neither	   remembering,	   nor	   forgetting,	   despite	   a	  person’s	  convictions	  otherwise.	  (Freud,	  393).	  However,	  Freud	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  a	  phenomenon	  of	   forgetting	  that	  bears	  uncanny	  resemblance	  to	  the	  case	  modeled	  in	  Jones’	   novel.	   In	   the	   “Repeating,	   Remembering	   and	   Working	   Through”	   chapter	  originally	  from	  Further	  Recommendations	  on	  Technique,	  he	  describes	  how	  a	  patient	  that	  has	  forgotten	  or	  repressed	  a	  traumatic	  event	  may	  only	  remember	  that	  event	  by	  acting	  it	  out:	  “The	  patient	  will	  yield	  to	  the	  compulsion	  to	  repeat	  –	  which	  now	  takes	  the	  place	  of	  the	  impulse	  to	  remember	  .	  .	  .	  The	  part	  played	  by	  resistance,	  too,	  is	  easily	  recognized.	   The	   greater	   the	   resistance,	   the	   more	   extensively	   will	   acting	   out	  (repetition)	  replace	  remembering”	  (Freud,	  395).	  This	  repetition	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  remembering	  the	  trauma.	  In	  fact,	  Freud	  posits	  that	  it	  is	  an	  act	  of	  repression,	  or,	  we	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might	  say,	  forgetting	  it.	  If	  we	  take	  Freud’s	  prediction	  seriously	  as	  a	  psychoanalysis	  of	  Ursa	  (and	  thus	  the	  United	  States	   in	  the	  context	  of	   this	  paper),	   then	  this	  suggests	  a	  disheartening	   possibility	   that	   the	  more	  we	   struggle	   to	   get	   away	   from	   slavery,	   the	  closer	  we	  will	  get	  to	  versions	  of	  its	  reality.	  	  This	  possibility	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Alexander’s	  findings.	  She	  notes:	  Following	   the	   collapse	   of	   each	   system	   of	   control,	   there	   has	   been	   a	  period	   of	   confusion—	   transition—	   in	   which	   those	   who	   are	   most	  committed	  to	  racial	  hierarchy	  search	  for	  new	  means	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals	  within	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game	   as	   currently	   defined.	   It	   is	   during	  this	  period	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  the	  backlash	  intensifies	  and	  a	  new	  form	  of	   racialized	   social	   control	   begins	   to	   take	   hold.	   The	   adoption	   of	   the	  new	   system	   of	   control	   is	   never	   inevitable,	   but	   to	   date	   it	   has	   never	  been	  avoided.	  	  (Alexander,	  21-­‐22)	  	  She	  does	  not	  close	  down	  the	  possibility	  that	  we	  might	  break	  from	  this	  cycle	  of	   forgetting	   by	   repeating,	   but	   she	   notes	   that	   we	   have	   never	   managed	   to	   do	   so	  before.	  Rather,	  each	  iteration	  has	  simply	  been	  replaced	  by	  another	  very	  much	  like	  it.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  what	  she	  identifies	  as	  the	  current	  iteration,	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  not	   simply	   that	   institutional	   racism	   today	   finds	   its	   strongest	   foothold	   in	   the	  American	  justice	  system,	  but	  that	  it	  operates	  specifically	  because	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  racially	  unbiased	  –	  indeed,	  colorblind	  –	  system.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  more	  we	  deny	  that	  race	  continues	  to	  present	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  greater	  a	  problem	   it	   is,	   and	   the	   greater	   a	   problem	   it	   becomes.	   Were	   we	   to	   admit	   the	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connection,	  to	  face	  our	  trauma,	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  problem,	  and	  thus	  begin	  to	  resolve	  it.	  In	  Ursa’s	  case,	  too,	  for	  all	  that	  her	  and	  her	  mother’s	  experiences	  of	  the	  time	  of	  their	  parents	  and	  grandparents	  during	  slavery	  are	  only	  second-­‐hand,	  their	  tendency	  to	  re-­‐perform	  the	  events	  of	  the	  great-­‐grandmother’s	  life	  is	  very	  strong.	  In	  apparent	  contrast	   to	  Freud’s	  predictions,	  Ursa’s	  grandmother,	  who	  would	  have	  experienced	  some	  of	  that	  relationship	  firsthand	  –	  being	  as	  she	  was	  the	  first	  Corregidora	  daughter	  –	  does	   remember	   in	   great	  detail.	   Indeed,	   far	   from	   forgetting	  her	  own	  experiences,	  she	  goes	  out	  of	  her	  way	  to	  hold	  onto	  them	  and	  those	  of	  her	  mother’s.	   	  Her	  actions,	  however	   do	   not	   depart	   from	   Freud’s	   predictions.	   The	   grandmother’s	   obsession,	  rather,	  amounts	  to	  the	  very	  act	  of	  repetition	  that	  Freud	  describes,	  and	  despite	  her	  apparent	   willingness	   to	   engage	   with	   those	   memories,	   she	   only	   succeeds	   at	  replicating	   –	   playing	   both	   the	   roles	   of	   Corregidora	   and	   her	   mother	   –	   and	   not	  resolving	   them.	   Thusly,	   for	   Ursa,	   though	   her	   grandmother	   provides	   Fradenburg’s	  and	  Freccero’s	  contextual	  anchor	  for	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  present	  day,	  what	  she	  passes	  on	  in	  the	  process	  is	  the	  same	  repression	  by	  obsessive	  repetition	  that	  leaves	  the	  matter	  so	  cripplingly	  unsettled.	  A	   textual	   example	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   this	   repression	   can	   be	   seen	   in	  Ursa’s	  description	  of	  the	  original	  slave	  owner	  Corregidora’s	  physical	  appearance.	  	  	  "I've	  got	  a	  photograph	  of	  him.	  One	  Great	  Gram	  smuggled	  out,	  I	  guess,	  so	  we'd	  know	  who	  to	  hate.	  Tall,	  white	  hair,	  white	  beard,	  white	  mustache,	  a	  old	  man	  with	  a	  cane	  and	  one	  of	  his	  feet	  turned	  outward,	  not	  inward,	  but	  outward.	  Neck	  bent	  forward	  like	  he	  was	  raging	  at	  something	  that	  wasn't	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there.	   Mad	   Portuguese.	   I	   take	   it	   out	   every	   now	   and	   then	   so	   I	   won't	  forget	  what	  he	  looked	  like.”	  (Jones,	  9)	  The	  emphasis	  on	  his	  being	  white,	  illustrated	  by	  the	  repetition	  in	  his	  physical	  description	  is	  a	  clue	  to	  his	  ascension	  to	  the	  status	  of	  mythology.	  Despite	  passages	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  book	  that	  describe	  him	  as	  dark	  enough	  to	  be	  mistaken	  for	  a	  Native	  American	  (and	  the	  rage	  he	  exhibits	  to	  anyone	  who	  points	  this	  out)	  the	  photograph,	  and	   the	  way	  Ursa	  describes	   it,	   records	  his	  whiteness	  as	   the	  key	   component	  of	  his	  appearance,	  eclipsing	  nearly	  every	  other	  feature.	  	  He	  stands	  not	  for	  himself,	  at	  least,	  not	   just	   himself,	   but	   for	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  white	   slave	   owner	  more	   generally.	   As	   an	  object	  of	  memory,	  he	  is	  simply	  white.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  only	  men	  allowed	  to	  purchase	   sex	   with	   Ursa’s	   great-­‐grandmother	   are	   those	   who	   are	   white	   like	  Corregidora	  himself,	  thus	  adding	  to	  the	  impression	  that	  while	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  women’s’	   memories	   is	   specific,	   what	   they	   represent	   to	   them	   is	   not.	   In	   his	   time,	  Corregidora	  provided	  an	  anecdote	  of	  oppression	  and	  abuse,	  but	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  women	  has	  made	  him	  a	  representation	  of	  white	  males	  more	  generally.	  Nor	   is	   this	   phenomenon	   limited	   to	   whites.	   Rather,	   fetishization	   of	   the	  blackness	  of	  Ursa’s	  great	  grandmother	   is	  equally	  strong:	  valued	   for	  her	  skin	  color,	  Ursa’s	  ancestor,	  and	  later	  Ursa	  herself,	  are	  generalized	  by	  this	  process	  of	  memory-­‐making	  into	  an	  almost	  legendary	  trope	  of	  the	  beautiful	  black	  woman	  for	  whom	  the	  fact	   that	  she	   is	  darker	  skinned	  is	  a	  part	  of	  her	   identity	  as	  much	  as	   it	   is	  part	  of	  her	  appearance.	  For	   both	   Corregidora	   and	   Ursa’s	   Great	   Gram,	   then,	   the	   two	   of	   them	   have	  become,	  in	  the	  micro-­‐society	  of	  their	  family,	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	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versions	   of	   Barthes’	   concept	   of	   mythology.	   No	   longer	   referencing	   only	   the	   direct	  presence	  of	  two	  once-­‐living	  people,	  the	  images	  of	  the	  two	  of	  them	  provide	  a	  model	  of	  the	  “natural”	  relationship	  that	  the	  women	  should	  have	  with	  men.	  The	  strength	  of	  this	   naturalized	  myth	   is	   most	   notable	   in	   how	  much	   stigma	  was	   placed	   on	   Ursa’s	  mother	   for	  consorting	  with	  a	  black	  man,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   that	  union	  created	  a	  new	  generation,	  Ursa,	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  record.	  Indeed,	  Ursa	  is	  not	  only	  necessary	  for	  providing	  them	  the	  next	  generation,	  but	  more	  than	  that,	  she	  closely	  resembles	  her	  Great	   Gram	   (with	   whom	   the	   line	   began)	   moreso	   than	   either	   of	   the	   other	   two	  women.4	  While	  Ursa,	  then,	  is	  a	  welcome	  result	  of	  her	  parents’	  relationship,	  her	  male	  parent	  is	  not,	  despite	  his	  necessity	  to	  her	  existence.	  Thusly	  does	  Ursa’s	  grandmother	  repeat,	  in	  the	  Freudian	  sense,	  the	  trauma	  of	  Corregidora’s	  conditioning	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  slave	  holder’s	  rules	  be	  not	  only	  recalled	  (remembered),	  but	  also	  observed,	  (repeated).	  In	  conjunction	  with	  Edelman’s	  theoretical	  framework,	  which	  establishes	  the	  dangers	   of	   fixation	   on	   the	   past,	   comparison	   of	   racial	   politics	   in	   the	   US	   with	  
Corregidora	   suggests	   another	   unsettling	   possibility.	   Too	   great	   an	   emphasis	   on	  preserving	   a	  present	  memory	  of	   the	  past,	   and	  without	  preserving	   the	  distinctions	  between	  one	  generation	  and	  the	  next,	  that	  is,	  marking	  progression,	  is	  the	  force	  that	  traps	  Ursa	  into	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  man	  who	  most	  closely	  resembles	  the	  abuser	  of	   her	   family’s	   past.	   For	   that	   matter,	   Mutt	   is	   her	   own	   abuser,	   having	   injured,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  It	  is	  noteworthy,	  thinking	  of	  Edelman,	  to	  consider	  that	  had	  Ursa’s	  grandmother	  succeeded	  in	  preventing	  her	  daughter’s	  relationship,	  and	  thus	  her	  resulting	  grandchild,	  her	  obsession	  with	  a	  past	  that	  is	  unreal	  if	  not	  actually	  fictional	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  her	  memories	  are	  manifestations	  of	  repression	  and	  not	  open	  engagement	  –	  would	  have	  destroyed	  any	  chance	  of	  her	  family	  continuing.	  She	  would	  quite	  literally	  have	  enacted	  the	  death	  drive	  that	  Edelman	  attributes	  to	  those	  thus	  obsessed.	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sterilized,	   stalked,	   and	   emotionally	   wounded	   her,	   yet	   as	   with	   the	   original	  Corregidora	  women,	   she	   cannot	   get	  her	   tormentor	  out	   of	   her	  head.	  Our	   collective	  national	   memory	   of	   slavery,	   and	   moreover	   the	   black	   American	   use	   of	   racial	  oppression	  as	  a	  focal	  point	  of	  community-­‐building	  shows	  reprisals	  of	  some	  aspects	  of	  Ursa’s	   relationship	   to	   Corregidora,	   and	   in	   several	   places	   in	   the	  novel,	   hints	   are	  given	  that	  suggest	  its	  possible	  allusion	  to	  a	  relationship	  that	  transcends	  individuals.	  As	  an	  example,	  I	  draw	  your	  attention	  again	  to	  Ursa’s	  description	  of	  Corregidora.	  There	   are,	   however,	   two	   key	   differences	   between	   Edelman’s	   fixation	   and	  what	  is	  seen	  here,	  both	  in	  the	  novel	  and	  in	  our	  racialized	  society.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  fixation	  is	  not,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ursa’s	  family,	  on	  returning	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  past,	  even	  as	  they	  repeat	  it.	  Rather,	  the	  fixation	  is	  on	  preserving	  the	  memory	  of	  that	  past.	   More	   importantly,	   however,	   is	   the	   second	   difference:	   crucial	   to	   Edelman’s	  theory	  is	  that	  the	  idealized	  past	  is	  wholly	  imagined,	  and	  completely	  impossible.	  Not	  only	  un-­‐reclaimable,	  then,	  but	  never	  having	  been	  had	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Thus	  Benn-­‐Michaels’	  easy	  dismissal	  of	  slavery	  as	  a	  mythology	  of	  our	  present	  day	  is	   invalid	  on	  the	   simple,	   if	   seemingly	   self-­‐evident	   grounds	   that	   slavery	   actually	   happened,	   and	  indeed,	   its	  proliferations,	  as	  Alexander	  has	  shown,	  are	  actually	  happening	  now.	  As	  with	   the	   photograph	   of	   Corregidora	   that	   Ursa	   keeps	   to	   remind	   herself	   of	   the	   old	  man’s	   appearance	   so	   that	   she	   “[would]	   know	   who	   to	   hate,”	   constant	   referral	   to	  slavery	  and	   its	  after-­‐effects	   for	   the	  sole	  sake	  of	  not	   forgetting	  wrongs	  done	  would	  seem	  to	  carry	  with	   it	   the	  same	  risk	  of	  stasis,	  of	  being	  unable	   to	  move	  beyond	  that	  trauma,	  but	  is	  that	  what	  has	  really	  happened	  to	  Ursa?	  Perhaps	  not.	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  Similarly,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  as	  a	  nation,	  we	  are	  getting	  closer,	  incrementally,	  to	  moving	  beyond	  merely	  repeating	  our	  worst	  memories	  by	  unproductively	  fixating	  on	  them.	  More	  than	  one	  hundred	  years	  on	  since	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery,	  the	  place	  of	  blacks	   in	   the	   US	   has	   changed	   for	   the	   better.	   Despite	   persistent	   racial	   inequality,	  conditions	  have	  improved	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  with	  the	  inauguration	  and	  re-­‐election	  of	  a	  black	  President,	  talk	  of	  a	  “post-­‐racial”	  nation	  has	  begun	  to	  enter	  the	  discourse	  on	  the	  state	  of	  social	  order.	  This	  diagnosis,	  I	  would	  say,	  is	  premature	  at	  best,	  indeed,	  I	  believe,	  as	  does	  Alexander,	  that	  it	  is	  indicative	  and	  encouraging	  of	  the	  worst	  kind	  of	  Freud’s	  forgetting.	  It	  would	  be	  heartening	  to	  be	  able	  to	  think	  of	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Corregidora	  women	  as	  an	  extreme	  one,	   inapplicable	   to	  society	  at	   large,	  but	  our	  relationship	   to	  memory	  bears	  more	  than	  passing	  resemblance	  to	  that	  of	  Ursa	  and	  her	  ancestors.	  For	  Benn-­‐Michaels,	  “racial	  memory”	  or	  “mythology”,	  two	  terms	  he	  uses	  to	  describe	  the	  set	  of	  social	  beliefs	  about	  the	  past	  that	  are	  held	  collectively	  by	  its	  members,	  are	  not	  only	   highly	   visible	   threads	   in	   the	   social	   fabric,	   but	   even	   have	   their	   place	   in	   some	  groups	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  community	  formation	  and	  reaffirmation.	  He	  concentrates	  on	  two	   groups	   to	   illustrate	   his	   point:	   Jews	   and	   black	   Americans,	   positing	   that	   the	  memory	  of	  great	  traumatic	  events,	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  US,	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  part	  of	  the	  history	  of	  these	  two	  groups,	  but	  a	  force	  so	  influential	  that	   it	   is	   that	   event	   that	   produced	   the	   community	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Citation	   of	  history,	  then,	  becomes	  a	  means	  of	  identity-­‐building	  among	  such	  groups,	  making	  the	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pressure	  never	   to	   forget,	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	  no	  one	  outside	   the	   group	   forgets,	   the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  those	  groups	  maintain	  their	  boundaries.5	  Further,	   Benn-­‐Michaels	   seems	   to	   attempt	   to	   make	   a	   purely	   abstract	  argument	  about	  rather	  substantiated	  realities.	  While	  his	  dismissal	  of	  the	  mythology	  that	  he	  claims	  operates	  as	  the	  binding	  force	  of	  these	  groups	  suggests	  that	  they	  have	  no	  real	  center	  upon	  which	  to	  build	  their	  community,	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  left	  out	  of	  his	  discussion	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   exist	   other	   forces	   that	   bind	   the	   groups	   together	  besides	  the	  mere	  knowledge	  of	  a	  shared	  past.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  shared	  past	  itself	  is,	   in	   a	   very	   practical	   sense,	   a	   binding	   force.	   As	   a	   simple	   example,	   the	  majority	   of	  black	  Americans	  in	  the	  US	  are	  here	  because	  their	  ancestors	  were	  slaves.	  One	  could	  presume	  with	   relative	  safety	   that	  without	   the	   transatlantic	   slave	   trade,	   the	  United	  States	  could	  very	  easily	  have	  developed	  without	  a	  significant	  black	  minority.	  	  On	  a	  greater	  scale,	  the	  Civil	  War,	  which	  began	  the	  cultures	  of	  many	  US	  states	  on	  the	  journey	  to	  their	  current	  social	  climates	  was	  caused	  by	  fights	  over	  state	  rights	  for	  which	  disputes	  over	  varying	   laws	  on	  slave	  ownership	  were	  the	   flashpoint.	  The	  emancipation	   (need	   I	   say	   it?)	   of	   slaves	   was	   accompanied	   by	   three	   separate	  amendments	   to	   the	  United	  States	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	   	  The	  release	  of	   those	  slaves	   into	  a	  social	  atmosphere	  of	  prejudice	  and	  racial	  oppression	  did	  nothing	  to	  integrate	  blacks	  into	   the	   American	   populace.	   Indeed,	   what	   happened	   was	   the	   opposite,	   as	  boundaries	   between	   the	   races	   were	   so	   fiercely	   maintained	   that	   black	   Americans	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Indeed,	  that	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  would	  suggest	  an	  inherent	  value	  of	  social	  mythology,	  in	  that,	  without	  it,	  if	  Benn-­‐Michaels’	  view	  is	  to	  be	  accepted,	  these	  groups	  would	  not	  exist	  at	  all.	  That	  he	  recognizes	  this	  and	  yet	  persists	  in	  his	  point	  is	  eloquent	  of	  his	  dismissal	  of	  these	  communities	  as	  meaningful	  entities	  rather	  than	  mere	  inventions.	  The	  accepted	  socially	  constructed	  nature	  of	  all	  groups,	  however,	  inclines	  this	  writer	  to	  wonder	  why	  he	  finds	  this	  kind	  of	  group	  formation	  so	  much	  less	  compelling	  than	  others.	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could	   expect	   to	   be	   indentified	   with	   each	   other	   whether	   they	   self-­‐identified	   as	   a	  group	  or	  not.	  	  That	  may	  seem	  a	  strange,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  self-­‐evident	  declaration,	  but	  as	  Benn-­‐Michaels	  counts	  “mythologies”	  as	  a	  central	  point	  of	  cohesion,	  it	  is	  worth	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  illustrate	  how	  weak	  that	  assertion	  appears	  in	  light	  of	  reality.	  The	  choice	  of	  identity	  maintenance	  that	  he	  implies	  in	  his	  article,	  I	  mean	  to	  show,	  is	  even	  more	  of	  an	   illusion	   than	   his	   concept	   of	   the	  mythology	   of	   slavery.	   Indeed,	   to	   complete	   our	  journey	  of	  connection	  to	  the	  present,	  I	  will	  add	  that	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  of	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  sought	  to	  continue	  the	  process	  that	  was	  begun	  with	  Emancipation,	  to	   integrate	   black	  Americans	   as	   equal	  members	   of	   a	   society	   that	   they	   had	   been	   a	  part	  of	  for	  generations.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  present	  day,	  the	  election	  of	  a	  black	  President	  (note	  that	  his	  being	  half-­‐white	  still	  does	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  choose	  his	  racial	  identity,	  as	   he	   is	   never	   considered	   white,	   rarely	   called	   mixed,	   and	   nearly	   always	   deemed	  black)	  has	  marked	  for	  many	  that	  process’s	  completion.	  	   True,	  no	  person	  alive	  remembers	  slavery,	  but	  the	  black	  community	  in	  the	  US	  has	  never	  been	  allowed	  to	  forget	   it.	  For	  whites,	  a	  similar	  problem	  exists.	  No	  white	  person	   currently	   living	  held	   slaves	   in	   the	  nineteenth	   century	  or	   any	   time	  prior	   to	  that.	  Yet	  the	  national	  embarrassment	  about	  slavery	  as	  a	  discourse	  in	  the	  present	  day	  in	   some	   degree	   stems	   from	   the	   resentment	   of	   being	   held	   (even	   by	   implication)	  responsible	   for	   the	   actions	  of	   one’s	   ancestors,	   or	   even,	   in	   the	   case	  of	  more	   recent	  immigrants,	  held	  responsible	  by	  association.	  Thus	   for	  both	  groups,	   the	  memory	  of	  slavery	   remains	   a	   kind	  of	   social	   burden,	   a	   trauma	   for	   blacks	   that	   keeps	   repeating	  itself,	   and	   for	   whites,	   a	   constantly	   repeating	   crime	   in	   which	   each	   successive	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generation	  can	  claim	  no	  direct	  part	  but	  must,	  it	  would	  seem,	  shoulder	  the	  guilt	  and	  culpabilty	  associated	  with	  it.	  	  As	  Ursa	  observes	  of	  her	  own	   relationship	   to	  Mutt,	   “We	  give	  each	  other	   too	  much	  hell”	  (Jones,	  113).	  By	  this	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting,	  as	  Ursa	  is	  not,	  that	  hurt	  has	  not	  been	   given	   to	   either	   party,	   or	   that	   no	   blame	  may	   thus	   be	   justly	   laid.	   	   But	   as	   two	  parties	   that,	   like	  Ursa	  and	  Mutt,	  do	  not	  have	  much	  chance	  of	   simply	   staying	  away	  from	  each	  other,	  blacks	  and	  whites	  in	  America	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  be	  together	   productively	   instead	   of	   injuriously.	   There	   is	   however,	   value	   in	   accepting	  and	  then	  moving	  beyond	  the	  simple	  insistence	  that	  racism	  is	  hurting	  everyone.	  The	  real	  issue	  is,	  how	  do	  we	  make	  the	  hurt	  stop?	  It	  cannot	  go	  unsaid,	  however,	  that	  the	  temptation	   to	   accept	   Benn-­‐Michaels’	   suggestion	   of	   dismissing	   slavery	   from	   the	  repertoire	   of	   national	  myths	  might	   seem	   attractive	   for	   its	   simplicity,	   and	   since	   it	  would	  mean	   that	   no	   one	  would	   be	   compelled	   to	   feel	   guilty	   or	   resentful	   over	   past	  wrongs.	   	  To	  do	  so,	  however,	  would	  be	   impossible,	  not	  because	  we	  cannot	   let	  go	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  because	  the	  past	  cannot,	  will	  not,	  let	  go	  of	  us.	  	  In	   some	   ways,	   this	   might	   suggest	   the	   possibility	   that	   slavery	   manages	   to	  remain	  with	  us	  because	  we	  are	   constantly	   expecting	   it	   to.	  Moreover,	   and	  perhaps	  more	  disturbingly,	  the	  implication	  we	  might	  take	  away	  from	  Edelman’s	  and	  Freud’s	  arguments	  is	  that	  we	  might	  even	  be	  actively	  repeating	  the	  circumstances	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  form	  of	  maintained	  racial	  inequality	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  our	  being	  unable	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  more	  directly	  than	  simply	  repeating	  it	  with	  differences,	  and	  yet,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  this	  very	  same	  repetition,	  we	  are	  wholly	  unable	  to	  step	  away	  from	  it.	  It	  remains	  imperative,	  however,	  that	  we	  do	  something	  to	  address	  it.	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It	   is	  worth	  noting	  at	   this	  point	   that	   the	  name	  “Corregidora”	   is	   the	   feminine	  form	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  word	  for	  “corrector.”	  As	  the	  original	  Corregidora	  is	  male,	  the	  name	  does	  not	  reference	  him,	  but	  Ursa	  is	  also	  Corregidora.	  Thus,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  she	  is	  our	  correctress.	  The	  tenacity	  with	  which	  her	  family	  has	  held	  onto	  the	  moniker	  seems	  to	  be,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book,	  at	  least	  one	  way	  in	  which	  their	  stranglehold	  on	  memory	   has	   had	   a	   positive	   effect.	   Ursa	   repeats	   the	   conditions	   of	   her	   great-­‐grandmother,	   but	   she	   does	   it	  with	   a	   difference	   –	   a	   correction.	  Her	   return	   to	  Mutt	  marks	  the	  breaking	  of	  the	  cycle,	  even	  as	  her	  hysterectomy	  breaks	  the	  genetic	  line	  of	  her	   family.	   Instead	  of	   remembering	   in	   the	   stagnating	  way	  modeled	   for	  her	  by	  her	  mother	   and	   grandmother,	   and	   instead	  of	   forgetting,	   denying	   the	   relevancy	  of	   that	  past	  to	  the	  present	  like	  the	  “post-­‐racial”	  camp	  might	  insist	  upon,	  Ursa	  has	  chosen	  a	  different	  relationship	  to	  her	  memories.	  She	  acknowledges	  her	  past	  injuries,	  but	  does	  not	  use	  her	  memories	  as	  a	  reason	  not	  to	  continue	  moving	  forward.	  She	  has	  stopped	  repeating	  the	  past,	  and	  therefore	  may	  finally	  move	  into	  her	  future.	  For	  the	  US,	  too,	  while	  we	  are	  hardly	  “post-­‐racial,	  our	  memories	  need	  not	  consume	  us.	  	  What	   then	   is	   the	   alternative?	   In	   Mythologies,	   Barthes	   acknowledges	   that	  myths,	  being	  as	  they	  are	  insidious	  and	  unavoidable,	  can	  nevertheless	  be	  contended	  with.	  In	  his	  estimation,	  by	  maintaining	  consciousness	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  social	  myth	  on	  all	  levels,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  limit	  its	  undetected	  influence	  as	  a	  shaping	  factor	  of	  one’s	  worldview,	  and	  also	  allows	  for	  one	  to	  even	  stand	  a	  chance	  of	  taking	  charge	  of	  that	  influence	  on	  others	  (240).	  	  In	   other	   words,	   rather	   than	   allowing	   the	   myth	   to	   be	   a	   part	   of	   one’s	  naturalized	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  Barthes	  urges	  constant	  awareness	  of	  its	  contrivance.	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Benn-­‐Michaels	  might	  be	  willing	   to	  agree	   to	   some	  extent	  on	   the	   contrivance	  of	   the	  myth	  of	  slavery	  since,	  as	  previously	  stated,	  he	  remains	  skeptical	  of	  whether	  slavery	  is	   a	   facet	   of	   our	   history	   whose	   influence	   cannot	   be	   dislodged	   from	   our	   present.	  Indeed,	  Benn-­‐Michaels	  would	  likely	  also	  be	  willing	  to	  grant	  that	  the	  slavery	  myth	  is	  as	  charged	  and	  multi-­‐valenced	  as	  Barthes	  suggests	   is	  natural	   to	  any	  social	  myth.	   I	  propose,	  however,	  that	  that	  feature,	  properly	  applied,	  could	  be	  turned	  productively	  rather	   than	   simply	   ignored.	   For	   that	  matter,	   it	   is	   not	   very	   clear	  what	   ignoring	   or	  dismissing	  that	  social	  myth	  would	  accomplish.	  That	   aside,	   if	   the	   maintenance	   of	   memory	   creates	   its	   own	   version	   of	  Edelman’s	  “death	  drive”	  for	  the	  Corregidora	  family,	  then	  what	  is	  the	  corrector	  that	  allows	   us	   to	   avoid	   our	   own	   crippling	   stagnation?	   As	   Ursa	   demonstrates,	   Benn-­‐Michaels’	   suggestion	   of	   what	   options	   are	   available	   in	   America’s	   relationship	   to	  slavery	  is	  incomplete.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  remember	  history	  constructively,	  and	  without	  allowing	  it	  to	  subsume	  our	  present.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  choice	  does	  not	  exist	  either	  between	   remembering	   and	   stagnating	   or	   forgetting	   and	  moving	   forward.	   Slavery,	  being	   history	   and	   not	   merely	   memory	   despite	   its	   current	   status	   as	   a	   national	  mythology,	   is	   a	   traumatic	   event	   in	   the	   life	   of	   our	   country	   that	   as	   Freud	   predicts,	  cannot	   be	   resolved	   or	   addressed	   by	   repression	   or	   avoidance.	   Benn-­‐Michaels’	  “forgetting,”	  then,	  would	  ensure	  that	  we	  never	  got	  past	  it.	  Remembering	  slavery	  for	  what	  it	  was,	  and	  addressing	  its	  consequences	  (at	  least	  partially	  accomplished	  just	  by	  admitting	  them	  for	  what	  they	  are)	  is	  not	  only	  the	  correct	  option,	  but	  the	  correcting	  option	  as	  well.	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CONCLUSION	  	  Luckily	  for	  us,	  perhaps,	  Jones’	  novel	  provides	  a	  potential	  suggestion	  for	  how	  to	  move	   forward.	   Turning	   again	   to	   the	   instance	   of	   Ursa’s	   realization	   of	   how	   then	  generations	  of	  her	  family	  run	  into	  each	  other,	  we	  witness	  a	  moment	  of	  illuminating	  clarity,	  certainly	  for	  the	  reader,	  and	  perhaps	  for	  Ursa	  as	  well	  as	  she	  realizes,	  in	  this	  blurring	  between	  experience,	  memory,	  and	  imagination,	  what	  her	  family	  is	  actually	  doing:	   that	   they	  describe	   a	  holding	  pattern	   that	   renders	   them	   static	   as	  much	  as	   it	  does	   the	   record	   they	   are	   trying	   to	   hold	   onto.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   encounter,	   Ursa	  reflects	   that	   “I	   was	   thinking	   that	   now	   that	   Mama	   had	   gotten	   it	   all	   out,	   her	   own	  memory	   –	   at	   least	   to	  me	   anyway	   –	  maybe	   she	   and	   some	  man	   .	   .	   .	   but	   then,	   I	  was	  thinking,	  what	  had	  I	  done	  about	  my	  own	  life?”	  (Jones	  151).	  This	  point	  in	  the	  novel	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  change	  in	  Ursa,	   in	  which	  she	   begins	   to	   alter	   the	   pattern	   that	   her	   family	   has	  modeled	   for	   her.	   Important	   to	  remember,	   however,	   is	   that	   Ursa’s	   change	   is	   not	   a	   complete	   departure	   from	   the	  Corregidora	  model.	   As	  Martin	   was	   able	   to	   guess,	   the	   relationship	   of	   Ursa’s	   Great	  Gram	  to	  Corregidora	  after	  the	  Civil	  War	  was	  a	  complicated	  one,	  with	  conflicting	  and	  powerful	  emotions	  attendant.	  Likewise,	  Ursa’s	  return	  to	  Mutt	  is	  not	  one	  without	  its	  contradictions.	  	  By	  accepting	  back	  her	  own	  Corregidora,	  Ursa	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  doing	  so	   in	  ignorance	  of	   the	  warning	   that	  Barthes	  gives	  about	   “naturalizing”	  mythologies,	  and	  choosing	   to	   continue	   the	   status	   quo	   of	   Corregidora	  women.	   To	   give	   it	   a	   different	  reading,	   she	   may	   simply	   be	   illustrating	   the	   difficulty	   commonly	   experienced	   by	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battered	  partners	  in	  completely	  cutting	  off	  ties	  with	  their	  abusers.	  Let	  us	  not	  forget	  that	  Mutt	  hospitalized	  her	  and	  caused	  her	   to	   lose	  her	  uterus,	  and	  not	  because	  she	  cheated	  on	  him,	  but	  because	  she	  sang	   in	  a	  nightclub	  where	  men	  could	   look	  at	  her.	  Equally	   important	   is	   that	   he	   stands	   in	   Ursa’s	   mind	   for	   the	   Portugese	   slaver	   that	  raped	  her	  great-­‐grandmother	  and	  grandmother,	  his	  daughter,	  and	  pimped	  them	  out	  to	   other	   men	   for	   the	   same	   purpose.	   Mutt	   both	   is	   and	   represents	   an	   incorrigible	  abuser,	  and	  yet	  Ursa	  is	  drawn	  to	  him.	  	  This	  illogical	  move	  might	  then	  be	  more	  usefully	  considered	  in	  broader	  terms	  than	   a	   single	   fictional	   character’s	   relationship	   to	   her	   battering	   husband.	   Black	  Americans,	   as	   I	   have	   suggested	   throughout	   this	   paper,	   have	   followed	   a	   similar	  trajectory	   to	   Ursa,	   fixating	   on	   a	   past	   that	   has	   saturated	   their	   present,	   and	   caught	  (more	   by	   circumstance	   than	   design)	   in	   the	   constant	   company	   of	   their	   abusers,	   to	  whom	  they	  must	  always	  return	  because	  there	  simply	  is	  no	  one	  and	  no	  where	  else.	  	  Then	   too,	   this	   relationship	   is	   necessarily	   having	   to	   be	   resolved	   by	   a	  generation	   of	   people	   on	   both	   sides	   who	   were	   not	   present	   at	   its	   beginning.	   No	  memories	  exist,	  though	  the	  power	  of	  the	  mythologies	  that	  are	  left	  to	  us	  are	  so	  strong	  as	  to	  command	  the	  attention	  of	  memory	  and	  the	  substance	  of	  our	  fictional	  works.	  That	  kind	  of	  remembering,	  though,	  is	  a	  triumph,	  not	  just	  over	  forgetting,	  but	  potentially	  over	  repeating	  as	  well.	  To	  see	  Ursa’s	  return	  as	  one	  more	  cycle	  of	  harmful,	  stagnating	  re-­‐enacting	   is	  only	  one	  way	  of	  parsing	   the	  ending	  of	   Jones’	  novel.	  More	  productively,	   we	   might	   take	   Ursa’s	   return,	   coming	   after,	   as	   it	   does,	   her	   long	  examination	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   her	   family	   and	   its	   past,	   as	   an	   acceptance	   of	   the	  inevitability	  of	  mythologies	  as	  part	  of	  our	  daily	   life,	   but	   an	  acceptance	   that	   comes	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with	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  knowledge	  that	  those	  are	  mythologies,	  and	  thus	  are	  tools	  that	  we	  may	  use	  to	  move	  forward.	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